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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXVI January, 1938 Number 2
THE STOCKHOLDERS' RIGHT TO INSPECT CORPORATE
BOOKS AND RECORDS IN CASES OF RECEIVERSHIP
AND REORGANIZATION
By RUDOLP E. UHImAN*
I. RIGHT OP STOCKHOLDERS TO INSPECT CORPORATE BOOKS AND
RECORDS: IN GENERAL
In England the view of the courts under the common law
was that the stockholders of a corporation had the right to
inspect the corporate books and records only when there was
a specific dispute about some corporate matter between the
stockholder and the management.' This view has now been
modified to some extent by the English Companies Act of 1929.2
In this country at common law a stockholder of a private
corporation has the right to inspect any or all of the books
and records of the corporation of which he is a member.3 This
right, however, is subject to the qualification that inspection
must be sought in good faith and for proper purposes. 4 As to
what constitutes a proper purpose entitling the stockholder to
inspection the courts are not in complete uniformity.5
The common law rule has been modified in most of the
states by statutes, the majority of which imposes no express
conditions upon the stockholder's right of inspection. 6 The
*J. U. D. 1933, University of Tuebingen, Germany; I. B. 1936,
Cornell University; Research Fellow, Harvard Law School, 1936-1938.
Author of "Das Recht Der Arbeitspapiere" (Tuebingen published dis-
sertation) and with Hans G. Rupp of "The German System of Admin-
istrative Courts: A Contribution to the Proposed Federal Administra-
tive Court" (1937) 31 Illinois Law Review 847, 1028.
1 Rex v. Merchant Tailor's Company, 2 B. & Ad. 116 (K. B. 1831).
'See Companies Act, 1929, §§ 98, 121, 135, 137.
2 Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 26 Sup. Ct. 4, 50 L. Ed. 130
(1905); Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239, 80 N. E. 524 (1906); In re
Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 53 N. R. 1103, 45 L. R. A. 461 (1899); Claw-
son v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 93 Pac. 729 (1908).
'Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 26 Sup. Ct. 4, 50 L. Ed. 130(1905).
5 See collection of cases in 80 A. L. R. 1502 (1932).
' See 5 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Perm. ed. 1931) § 2220.
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courts, however, have differed in their interpretation of these
statutes. While some courts hold that the right is absolute
where statutory, regardless of purpose, the majority of the
courts regard the purposes'and motives of a stockholder invoking
his right of inspection under a statute as proper subjects of
judicial inquiry.7 The judicial limitation of the statutory grant,
absolute on its face, is said to be justified either by the theory
that these statutes are merely declaratory of the common law,8
or because the court still retains its discretion in issuing
the writ of mandamus. 9 But, whatever may be the legal theory,
"the shareholder's privilege of inspecting the books and papers
of his corporation should be determined by balancing his indi-
vidual interest against the interests of the other members of
the incorporated group with whom he is associated."' 0
The legal problems arising out of the stockholder's right of
inspection while the corporation is a going concern are numerous.
Their discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Here, we are interested only in the question whether the right
of the inspection survives after a receiver or trustee has been
appointed for the corporation.
It is well established that a receiver or trustee appointed by
the court is entitled to the possession of the books and records of
the corporation and that mandamus will lie for their surrender
by the officers of the corporation." Once the receiver or trustee
has obtained possession of the books and records, the question
arises whether the stockholder's right of inspection still exists.
The problem has come before the courts at several instances and
the purpose of this paper will be to show the judicial process
which has led to its solution.
II. RIGHT OF INSPECTION IN CASE OF CORPORATE LIQUIDATION
The shareholder's right to inspect the books of a corporation
O'Hara v. National Biscuit Co., 69 N. J. L. 198, 54 Atl. 241
(1903); People ex rel. Britton v. American Press Assn,, 148 App.
Div. 651, 133 N. Y. Supp. 216 (1912); State ex rel. Weinberg v. Pacific
Brewing & Malting Co., 21 Wash. 451, 58 Pac. 584 (1899).
8 O'Hara v. National Biscuit Co., 69 N. J. L. 198, 54 Atl. 241
(1903).
9Bernert v. Multnomah Lumber & Box Co., 119 Ore. 44, 247 Pac.
155, (1926); State er rel Weinberg v. Pacific Brewing & Malting Co.,
21 Wash. 451, 58 Pac. 584, (1899).
"0Stevens, Corporations (1936) 430.
"Manning v. Mercantile Securities Co., 242 Ill. 584, 90 N. E. 238
(1909), affd. 217 U. S. 597, 30 Sup. Ct. 696, 54 L. Ed. 896 (1910);
Foster v. Stewart, 113 Kan. 402, 214 Pac. 429 (1923).
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which was to be liquidated has been discussed in several English
decisions.
The first case of this kind is In re Birmingham Banking
Company.12 In this case the shareholder of a company which
was in the process of liquidation petitioned the court for leave
to inspect the corporate books and records. The liquidator wtho
opposed this petition referred to the great inconvenience which
would ensue if anybody were allowed to inspect the books of
the company in liquidation. The court, however, granted the
leave desired by the plaintiff and ordered the liquidator to pro-
duce the books and records of the company. In the opinion of
the court this order was fully warranted by the Companies' Act
of 1862, which left it to the discretion of the court whether or
not it wished to compel such production.13 But the court
declared it to be the duty of the petitioner not divulge the
information acquired and intimated that, if necessary, it would
enjoin him from so doing.14
In the similar case of In re Joint Stock Discount Company,'5
the English court reached the same decision and, upon appli-
cation by several shareholders of a defunct corporation, ordered
the liquidator to make the books and papers of the company
accessible and to permit the taking of abstracts therefrom. But,
as in the Birmingham Banking Company case, supra, the court
declared that it would enjoin any disclosure of the information
obtained by the shareholders.
In In re West Devon Great Consols Mine,16 there was an
appeal from the decree of a lower court in a winding-up pro-
ceeding authorizing the shareholders of the company which was
to be wound up to examine the corporate book and vouchers.
The Chancery Division considered the decree to be lawful and
dismissed the appeal by a unanimous decision. Particularly,
- 36 L. J. Ch. 150 (1866).
3 See Companies' Act, 1862, Sec. 156. It is interesting to note
that the court granted the leave to inspect the books of the company,
although there was a secrecy clause in the articles to the effect that
no shareholder or creditor should have the right to inspect the books
of the company.
-"Also, in this country, the courts have held that shareholders
may be enjoined from making wrongful use of the information
acquired as a result of inspection. State ex rel. Dempsey v. Werra
Aluminum Foundry Co., 173 Wis. 651, 182 N. W. 354 (1921); State
ez rel. Mandelker v. Mandelker, 197 Wis. 518, 222 N. W. 786 (1929).
36 L. J. Ch. 150 (1866).1827 Ch. D. 106 (1884).
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Lord Cotton pointed out that it was within the lawful discretion
of the court below to make the order complained of:
"I do not encourage the idea that a petitioner for a winding-up
order has a right to have discovery to support his case, to fish out, in
fact, something that may help him. . . . The suggestion that the
statements in the petition might be proved by the books would not be
sufficient grounds. These were the letter and statements of the purser,
and the Petitioner had a reasonable ground for asking for inspection
to see if these statements and letter were well founded. I think, there-
fore, there were sufficient grounds for the order of inspection, and that,
Independently of the winding-up petition, the Vice-Warden had full
jurisdiction to make it." 17
In the United States the first case dealing with our problem
is Re Tiebout.' s In this case, the New York Supreme Court,
on appeal, reversed an order of the lower court denying the
application of a corporate creditor for leave to inspect the books
- 27 Ch. D. 106, 109 (1884). See also Fenton Textile Assn., Ltd.
v. Lodge, [1928] 1 K. B. 1 (A receiver named by holders of a com-
pany's debenture, who had previously been the company's manag-
ing director, was held not entitled to refuse to produce its books
of account and records, so far as material, to permit their
inspection by a litigant claiming that a fraudulent conspiracy existed
between him and the company, both being sued as co-defendants).
m 19 N. Y. Weekly Dig. 570 (1884). Prior to this case the New
York Supreme Court had to consider the question whether a share-
holder in an insolvent corporation has the right to examine the books
of the receiver. In Fowler's Petition, 9 Abbot's New Cases 268 (1878),
a shareholder of the Erie Railway Company petitioned the court for
leave to examine the books of the receiver who had been appointed
for the company. The court granted the petition, using the following
language: "The receiver is an officer of the court, and the books, con-
tracts, and accounts relating to his connection with the road are in
custodia legis-in the custody of the law; and, therefore, In this court
to all intents and purposes. He is the trustee of all the owners of the
bonds and stocks, and of the creditors of the company, and these own-
ers are his cestuis que trust. What he does should be done openly,
unless the interests of the estate with which he is invested demand
privacy, a circumstance which must rarely occur. His management
is therefore for the cestuis que trust, who are bondholders, stock-
holders and creditors, and they are entitled to an inspection of his
books, papers and accounts relating to his receivership, and it should
be allowed on all reasonable applications for the purpose." (Id.
269.) But the court carefully limited its order to a leave to inspect
the books of the receiver as distinguished from the books of the com-
pany itself. "It follows necessarily, therefore, that the petition pre-
sented herein, if it rests upon proper considerations, should be
granted so far as it relates to the books, accounts, and contracts of
the receiver, as contradistinguished from those of the company prior
to his appointment, unless some good reason exists why that liberty
should not be given. The petition herein presented is considered suf-
ficient for that purpose, and no good reason is shown why it should
not be granted. If the books of the company eo norine, aside from
those containing the transactions of the receiver, are to be inspected,
it must be accomplished in some other mode not necessary now to
be considered." (Id. 270.)
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of a company in the hands of a receiver. Although the case
came up on the application of a corporate creditor, the language
used by the court is sufficiently broad to indicate that the
decision would not have been different if the application had
been made by a shareholder instead of by a creditor. The
decision is interesting because, in the opinion of the court, the
right to inspect the books of a company in the hands of a
receiver rests on principles different from those which governed
while the corporation was a going concern. Thus, it was held by
the court:
"That the authority of the Court in such a case does not rest upon
the technical rights of stockholders or creditors, as between themselves
and the corporation, under the statutes relating to corporations, but
upon grounds of justice and equity in administering the trust in the
hands of the receiver, and that the application was addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court in the exercise of its power over the
books and papers of a corporation in the hands of its receiver and
therefore in law in the hands of the Court, and that the application
depends upon very different principles from those which would pre-
vail if the books were in the hands of the company. That the matter
therefore was one for the exercise of discretion, and that it was neitherjudicious nor equitable to refuse to any party in interest an opportunity
to examine and take extracts from books held by a receiver under
such circumstances.""
The next case involving the right to inspect the books of a
corporation in the hands of a receiver is People v. Cataract
Bank.20 In this case, stockholders of a dissolved bank for which
a receiver had been appointed petitioned the court for an order
directing the receiver to permit them to make an inspection and
examination of the books, papers, writings and property of the
bank, and to make abstracts therefrom. Relying on the Tiebout
case, supra, the court made the order asked for, since "no reason
is apparent why the information sought by them should be
withheld."
In Matter of Tuttle v. Iron NationaZ Bank of Plattsburgh,2 1
the New York Court of Appeals was to consider the application
by certain stockholders of a national bank, which was in the
course of liquidation, for the issuance of a writ of mandamus,
requiring the presentation of the books, papers and assets of the
" But of., also, the dissenting opinion of Judge Daniels, who held
that the appellant's right of inspection could be enforced only under
a special statutory provision in that regard, which could not be
applied In the absence of proof that the company was incorporated
under the act that contained such provision.
25 Misc. 14, 25 N. Y. Supp. 129 (1893).
170 N. Y. 9, 62 N. E. 761 (1902).
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bank to the petitioners. The court affirmed the order of the
Appellate Division granting the relief prayed for and the
opinion pointed out that this ruling did not impede the process
of liquidation.22
"The facts not in dispute were sufficient to justify the court in
ordering the officers in charge of the bank's affairs to furnish informa-
tion as to the description of the bank's assets, to the extent set forth
in its order. Such information was only what the stockholders were
entitled to have, in the situation of affairs. It could in no wise prej-
udice the liquidation of the bank, and its officers should not have
refused to the stockholders the statements which they naturally desired
and which, upon equitable principles, they were entitled to have con-
cerning their distributory interests in the corporate property."'
The shareholders' right of inspection in case of corporate
liquidation has also been discussed in some recent federal cases.
In Wittnebel v. Lougkman,2 4 the plaintiff was a large
stockholder in a defunct national bank for which a receiver had
been appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency.
The receiver had taken no action against the president
and officers of the bank, although the plaintiff had
laid facts before him which showed mismanagement and negli-
gence in the conduct of the affairs of the bank. When also
repeated requests by the plaintiff to the receiver for permission
to see the books and records of the bank had remained unsuccess-
ful, the plaintiff brought suit to restrain the receiver from
impeding his examination of the corporate books and records.
The receiver moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a
cause of action claiming that the stockholders of a defunct
national bank have no right to examine the books and records
of the company in possession of a receiver, except by leave of
the receiver and that the refusal of the receiver to permit exami-
"The opinion also emphasized that the rule giving to a stock-
holder the right to inspect the books of the corporation is as applica-
ble to the case of a banking corporation, as It is to any other kind of
corporation and that jurisdiction over actions against national banks
has not been taken away from the state courts by the National Bank-
ing Act, citing Cooke v. State National Bank of Boston, 52 N. Y. 96
(1873), and Robinson v. National Bank of Newberne, 81 N. Y. 385
(1880).
-170 N. Y. 9, 11 (1902). See also Commonwealth ex rel v. The
Phila. and Reading R. R. Co., 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 115 (1893), where a writ
of mandamus was granted to the shareholders commanding the receiv-
ers and officers of the defendant railroad company to permit them to
inspect the stock ledger of list of stockholders and make copies thereof.
'49 F. Supp. 465 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
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nation is conclusive. The District Court held that the plaintiff's
bill stated a cause of action and denied, therefore, the motion
of the receiver. The opinion of the court starts with the general
rule that prior to receivership a stockholder in a national bank
has a common-law right to inspect the books of the bank.25 This
right is dependent on the good faith of the stockholder and must
be germane to his interest in the corporation. Apart from
those qualifications, the right is unlimited while the bank is a
going concern and the court must thus determine whether or
not the right survived the receivership. Reviewing the prior
cases dealing with business corporations and state banks, the
court found that the right of inspection does not expire on
receivership.
"As to corporations generally, a stockholder's right to examine
the corporate books is not extinguished by receivership. The receiver
has possession and custody of the books, but he has no better authority
to bar access to them by stockholders than the corporate officers had
before receivership. . . Unless there is a solid distinction be-
tween the receivership of a national bank, the stockholder's right of
examination in the latter case is not at the mercy of the receiver."16
The court then examined the provisions of the National
Banking Act dealing with the appointment of a receiver by the
Comptroller of the Currency.27 After this examination, the
court concluded:
"There Is nothing in the statute or in the decisions interpreta-
tive of it that is destructive of the stockholder's right to examine the
books of the closed bank or that vests the comptroller or the receiver
with arbitrary powers to keep the books from the stockholders. The
stockholders are still stockholders. They are entitled to any surplus
that may remain after payment of debts. Because of such interest,
they may under certain conditions bring suit in the bank's right
against officers and directors who have wasted the assets, in cases
where the receiver has refused to bring suit . . . The right to
bring such suit would generally be barren if the comptroller or receiver
could arbitrarily deprive a stockholder of an inspection of the books."',
Admitting then that there may be cases where the receiver
may lawfully refuse the inspection of the corporate books and
records by the shareholders, the court emphatically declared
that in the present case the refusal of the defendant to permit
inspection was wholly unjustified.
1 See Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 26 Sup. Ct. 4, 50 L. Ed.
130 (1905); Curtis v. Connly, 257 U. S. 260, 42 Sup. Ct. 100, 66 L. Ed.
222 (1921).
" 9 F. Supp. 465, 467 (1935).
2112 U. S. C. A. §§ 191 et seq.
89 F. Supp. 465, 468 (1935).
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"There may be instances where a stockholder's examination of
the books would be disruptive of plans for reorganization then pending
and would thus imperil the interests of creditors and other stock-
holders. There may be instances where there is no purpose other
than curiosity to- be served by permitting examination. Such cases
may be dealt with when they come up. But where a stockholder
makes grave charges of malfeasance against the officers and directors,
with the receiver refusing to take action, and alleges facts tending to
show that the interests of creditors and stockholders cannot be prej-
udiced by an examination of the books, no reason is apparent why he
should not have the desired examination. It is not perceived how an
examination in such a case can be said to impede or embarrass the
prompt and effective winding up of the insolvent estate. A bill setting
forth such facts makes a prima facie case for relief in court and is
sufficient on its face."'"
From the decree of the District Court enjoining him from
interfering with the plaintiff's inspection of the books and
records of the bank the receiver appealed. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree
of the court below.3 0 Judge Augustus N. Hand, who delivered
the opinion of the court, pointed out that a stockholder of a
national bank in the hands of a receiver is not entitled to the
inspection of the corporate books as a matter of right, but
that the courts will decree such inspection if, as in the present
case, the refusal of the receiver to permit such inspection seems
to be inequitable.
".It is manifest that a stockholder of an insolvent national bank Is
vitally interested in the efficient liquidation of its assets, not only
because of his possible right to share in a surplus after payment of
the debts, but also because the amount of the assessment on his stock
which the comptroller may levy will be directly affected by the suc-
cess of the receiver in collecting outstanding claims. It is true that a
liberal construction has always been placed upon the National Bank-
ing Act, so that the liquidation of insolvent banks can proceed without
undue interruptions and to as prompt a conclusion as possible. But
a recognition of the right of a stockholder to obtain an order for an
examination of the books of a bank, in case where a fair reason for
the examination is shown and where the examination is so conducted
as not to inconvenience the receiver in his administration, preserves
rights of stockholders that existed prior to the time when the comp-
troller took over the administration, is not in derogation of any stat-
ute, and affords a safeguard against careless administration and arbi-
trary conduct. It should only be granted where there is a showing of
some justifiable reason; otherwise the comptroller might be unduly
harassed in his administration."n
In reaching the result that the plaintiff should be given the
opportunity to examine the corporate books in the hands of
29IbidZ.
*Wittnebel v. Loughman, 80 F. (2d) 222 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935),
cert. den. 297 U. S. 716, 56 Sup. Ct. 590, 80 L. Ed. 1001 (1936).
"Id., at 223, 224.
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the receiver, Judge Hand particularly stressed the fact that
without such opportunity for inspection the plaintiff's right
to bring a shareholder's bill for mismanagement by the president
and the officers of the company would be without much practical
value.
"If the officers or the receiver fail to sue on demand, a stockholder
has the right to bring a representative suit on behalf of the bank to
redress wrongs which it has suffered . . . Such a right would be
Ineffective if the stockholder could not determine by an inspection
whether there was a basis to sustain his cause of action. We can
see no reason for so abridging the common-law right as to deprive
a shareholder of the means of protecting his interest by an inspection
so long as it may be had without undue interference with the admin-
istration of the receiver."' '
Another federal case with bearing on our problem is
Fbance Co. of America at Baltimore v. Brock.33 Plaintiffs
in this case had brought an action at law in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to recover damages
from the directors and officers of the then defunct Canal Bank
& Trust Company for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by
which the plaintiffs were induced to take stock in this company.
The plaintiffs then brought a bill of discovery in the District
Court in aid of their action at law against the liquidators of
the Canal Bank & Trust Company, who had been appointed by
the state court, for the presentation of numerous books and
records of the company containing evidence material to the case.
The liquidators of the company met the bill with a motion to
dismiss for want of jurisdiction of the Federal court, claiming
that the State court had exclusive juridiction over the liqui-
dation. The District Court sustained this motion of the liqui-
dators and dismissed the bill. On appeal, the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the dismissal by the court below for want
of jurisdiction constituted error in law and remanded the case.
The court held that in a proper case a Federal court can require
discovery of state liquidators, but expressed no opinion on the
question whether in the present case a bill of discovery could
be successfully brought against the liquidators. Since the
plaintiffs were stockholders of the defunct banking company,
their proper mode of relief, in the opinion of the court, was a suit
for inspection of the corporate books and records.
11Id., at 224.
"80 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
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"But the complainants here are stockholders also of the defunct
bank, and, while their right of examination of their own books may be
somewhat limited by the possession of the liquidators, who are 
in a
sense the officers of the state, the cases indicate that the liquidators,
when guided by a court, should be liberal in permitting stockholders
to inform themselves for their own protection."3'
III. RiIIT OF INSPECTION IN CASE OF CORPORATE
REORGAINxZATION
Whereas the cases considered in the preceding section dealt
with the shareholder's right of inspection in case of corporate
liquidation, the following cases will present the problem whether
the shareholders are entitled to examination of the corporate
books and records in case of a corporate reorganization. The
courts in these cases are frequently faced with the task of
reconciling conflicting interests. On the one hand, there is
the interest of the public and of a majority of the parties con-
cerned in a speedy and effective enforcement of a given reorgani-
zation scheme, whereas, on the other hand, individual sharehold-
ers wish to use the device of a request for inspection of the cor-
porate books to suggest or to inaugurate a different plan of re-
organization, which seems to be more attractive to them. How the
courts will weigh these conflicting equities and how solve this
clash of opposite interests will appear from the following
decisions.
The English case of It re Glamorganshire Banking Comp-
any,3 5 deals with the right of inspection by a dissenting share-
holder in case of a corporate reconstruction under the Com-
panies Act of 1862. In this case, the majority of the shareholders
resolved that it was desirable to reconstruct the company, and
that, with a view thereto, the company be wound up voluntarily
and that liquidators be appointed and authorized to consent to
the registration of a new company. Subsequently to this reso-
lution, one Mrs. Morgan, who belonged to the dissenting mi-
nority, asked the liquidators to purchase her stock interest in
the company. When the liquidators offered to purchase her
interest at the rate of 5s. in the pound, Mrs. Morgan declined
4 80 F. (2d) 713, 715 (1936). See also State ex rel. Burleigh v.
Miller, 266 S. W. 985 (Supr. Ct. of Mo. 1924), where it was held that a
receiver who had sued an alleged subscriber for stock in a corporation
was not entitled to object to the latter's obtaining an order for Inspec-
tion of the corporation's books.
28 Oh. . 620 (1884).
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the offer and asked that the price be settled by arbitration, in
accordance with Section 161 of the Companies Act. Three months
after this application for arbitration under the statute, Mrs.
Morgan asked the liquidators to permit the books of the company
to be inspected for the purpose of advising her whether the offer
originally made by the liquidators was sufficient. The liquidators
declined to produce the books for inspection, whereupon, Mrs.
Morgan's attorney filed a bill asking the court to order the
liquidators to produce the books of the company. After the
bill had been filed, both parties appointed arbitrators in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Companies Act. After a hearing,
the court dismissed the bill for the production of the corporate
books. Lord Bacon, delivering the opinion of the court, pointed
out that it lies within the discretion of the court to permit share-
holders to inspect the books of a company in the process of
reconstruction, but that in the case at bar, the court will not
make use of this discretion.
"If a case were presented to the Court in which fraud was sug-
gested, or inaccuracy was at all pointed out, or even hinted at, the
Court would have to exercise that discretion which is reposed in it
and do its best to see that justice was being done between the parties.
But in this case the facts agreed to are clear and plain. All that has
been done has been done regularly. All the members of the old com-
pany except six have agreed to that which has been done."' '
The court then emphasized that the books had been handed
over to the possession of the new company and that the liqui-
dators had, therefore, lost the custody of them. But the real
basis of the decision is that the plaintiff had elected to invoke
arbitration and had, therefore, no legal or equitable interest in
the examination of the books of the company.
"The application dealing with this peculiar subject is different
from that in the Birmingham Bank, Case, and others, where the thing
had come to an end, and where the secrecy clause was resorted to, and
resorted to in vain. That is not so here. The current accounts which
the customers had with the old bank are carried on into the new bank,
and the applicant desires to look into those accounts and see what is
their condition, not even by herself, because she cannot do it, but her
solicitor or agent is to be let in to examine the circumstances of the
several customers in the accounts before the transfer. The terms of
the summons are open to no kind of limitation. They are to produce
everything in the world relating to the assets of the company. There
never was a case in which any such application was entertained by
this Court. The Act of Parliament has with the utmost caution pro-
vided for the state of circumstances now before me. It has given to
any dissentient shareholder who does not accept the proceedings
-28 Ch. D. 625 (1884).
L. J.-2
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adopted by the majority of the shareholders the right to go to abritra-
tion. He goes to arbitration with all the powers contained in the Act
of 1862, and with all the powers contained in the Common Law Pro-
cedure Act. What may be the result of the arbitration I cannot at the
present moment anticipate, but there are means provided by the law to
enable the applicant, who last April chose to go to arbitration, to go to
that arbitration safely, and with the means of getting the fullest infor-
mation she is entitled to. In my judgment, no reason has been sug-
gested, nor has any word of proof or argument been adduced to lead
me to believe that there is any necessity for that production which is
asked for by this summons. Therefore I must dismiss it."'3
The case just considered illustrates in an interesting way
that the courts will deny the right of inspection if a shareholder
instead of participating in the reorganization scheme wants to
liquidate his interest in the company and his right of infor-
mation is otherwise protected by statute. In such a case an
inspection of the corporate books by the shareholder would
unduly delay and hamper the process of reorganization. But,
as indicated by the opinion, in proper cases the courts will grant
to shareholders the right to inspect the books of a company which
is undergoing reorganization, if the balance of equities is in their
favor.
The leading American case on the subject is (ikable v.
Nica.ragua Canal Construction Co.3s In this case, a shareholder
of a corporation in the process of reorganization, who had
acquired his stock six months after the appointment of the
receiver, asked the court for leave to inspect the company's
books in the hands of the receiver. The receiver, who had refused
the permission for inspection, defended on the ground that the
petition, if successful, might endanger a plan for reorganization
approved by the majority of the shareholders, which provided
for an early liquidation of the debts of the company.
The court, before going into the merits of the case at bar,
attempted to lay down certain general rules determining the
shareholders' right of examination in cases of receivership and
corporate reorganization. Although the language of the court
on this point is merely dictum, its full citation seems to be
warranted, since most of the later cases are relying on it:
"When a corporation has suffered financial shipwreck, and Its
property and assets, including its books, come into the possession of
the court and the custody of the court's officer, the receiver, the ques-
tion whether or not an inspection of those books shall be accorded to
a stockholder in the shipwrecked concern is one resting in the discre-
a1ff., at 626, 627.
59 Fed. 846 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1894).
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tion of the court, unhampered by any decisions touching such right of
Inspection while the corporation was still a going concern in the hands
of its officers and directors. Ordinarily it would seem that such dis-
cretion should be exercised by the court most liberally towards every
individual stockholder who shows some reason other than mere idle
curiosity which induces him to ask for the inspection. It is no doubt
a fact that in many cases the information derived and the conclusions
arrived at upon such inspection may promote differences of opinion,
controversies, and animosities between members of the corporation,
and to that extent be an interruption to the conduct of its affairs, but
that is one of the misfortunes attendant upon financial shipwreck.
The right of the individual stockholder to obtain from the court an
inspection of its books in the court's custody, in order to inform him-
self as to past transactions and present conditions, or to enable him to
determine what may be most conducive to the protection of his own
interests as a stockholder in the future, is one entitled to the favorable
consideration of a court of equity.
"The theory of a receivership such as this is that the court takes
possession of the assets of the corporation with the intention of distrib-
uting them equitably among all entitled to receive, without exposing
creditors and stockholders alike to the heavy sacrifices which would
be likely to occur should the property as an entirety be broken up, and
sold, bit by bit, as the result of a ruinous race of diligence between
creditors. Having the securities in its possession, the court retains
them until they can be properly marshalled, the claims of all ascer-
tained, the property converted into money, and the same distributed
equitably according to the rights of all parties. Frequently, before
this termination of the proceeding is reached, some plan of reorganiza-
tion, satisfactory to nearly all interested, and abundantly protecting
the full legal and equitable rights of those not entering into it, is per-
fected, and the receivership terminates by a sale of the property to
some new corporation, or to some committee, organized under such a
plan. A stockholder who in good faith asks for an examination of the
books in the custody of the court, in order to enable him to determine
whether or not such a proposed plan of reorganization is or is not a
desirable one for himself and the other stockholders to enter into,
should be accorded such inspection, under proper regulations as to time
and circumstance, so as not to interfere either with the transaction
of the receiver's duties or with such inspection as his fellow members
may be entitled to.""
The court, after having thus expressed that in reorganization
cases the courts should be most liberal in granting the right of
inspection to dissenting shareholders, undertook to consider the
specific objections raised by the receiver against the present
petition. With regard to the objection that the object of the
application was to obtain material to be used in convincing
other stockholders that a proposed plan of reorganization should
not be carried out and that the application was primarily intend-
ed to interfere with the accomplishment of a plan which met
the approval of a majority of the stockholders, who had been
-59 Fed. 846, 847 (1894).
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content to accept it without such information as here asked for,
the court said:
"This objection, however, is not a sufficient answer to the applica-
tion. The fact that a majority of the persons interested are satisfied
thus to accept it is no reason why a stockholder who wishes for
further information, to which he is entitled, should be refused it, even
though, when it is once obtained, he intends to present it to his fellow
stockholders as an argument to dissuade them from'accepting the plan.
If the plan is one which commends itself to those interested, his argu-
ments will probably have little weight with them."' 0
The further objection of the receiver that the petition
tended to defeat a reorganization scheme which seemed to be
very satisfactory and promising was met by the court in the
following words:
"The receiver himself appears by counsel before the court, asking
that he be instructed to refuse permission, on the ground that the
proposed plan is one which promises to afford means for an early liqui-
dation of the debts of the company, and the renewal of the work of
construction; that he has uniformly commended the scheme of reorgan-
ization already proposed, and that the apparent object of the petitioner
and his associates is to defeat such plan. So far as he has heretofore
refused to allow inspection of the books by the stockholders, his course
is entirely approved. In every case of doubt it is well for a receiver
to refrain from action until he may obtain the instruction of the court,
whose officer he is. It is not, however, the duty of a receiver to formu-
late or to promote one or other proposed plan of reorganization.
Whether there shall be a new organization formed of stockholders, bond-
holders, or creditors, with what respective interests, and upon what
terms, is one that should be left for the determination of the persons
interested, without interference in any way by the court or its officers.
The court in these cases is a harbor of refuge, not a repair shop.""
The court concluded its inquiry into the shareholders' right
to inspect the books of a company undergoing reorganization
with the statement that it had felt bound to discuss the merits
of the petition since, as stated on the argument of the case, some
sixty or more stockholders were asking for an inspection. How-
ever, the court denied relief to the present petitioner because it
appeared that he did not become a stockholder until six months
after the appointment of the receiver.
"It is manifest that this situation is very different from that of
one who was a stockholder of record at the time of the catastrophe
which wrecked the corporation. Such a stockholder, the value of whose
'Old., at 847.
411d., at 847, 848. In so far as the opinion seems to indicate that
the fairness of the reorganization plan is no matter of the court's con-
cern, this part of the opinion may be considered as overruled by the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Boyd case. See Northern Pacific
Railway Company v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed.
931 (1913).
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property has been affected by the manner in which the business of
the corporation has been conducted, is entitled to a different measure
of consideration from that shown to a mere speculator, who, after the
property has passed to the receiver, buys an interest in what may be
saved out of the wreck.",-
The principles of the Chable case, supra, have found appli-
cation in the recent Maryland case of Newcomer v. Miller.43
Although this case does not concern a corporate reorganization
in a technical sense, the case furnishes close analogies to strict
reorganization cases. In this case, one Miller and his wife
were the sole stockholders in a family corporation. Miller, who
was also president of the corporation, pledged all of the stock
in the company to some of his creditors in order to secure an
indebtedness of $1,500,000. On June 29, 1933, a bill in equity
was filed in the name of Mrs. Miller, alleging that the corpo-
ration was indebted to her and praying for the appointment
of receivers for the company. Miller consented to the receiver-
ship and he and his wife's attorney were appointed receivers.
On July 26, 1933, the foreclosure and sale of the collateral
occurred, and the pledgees then became the owneis of all the
stock. On August 10, 1933, the receivers reported to the court
a contract with Mrs. Miller, subject to the approval of the court,
to purchase all the assets of the corporation. On September 25,
no exceptions having been filed, the sale was finally ratified by
the court. On the same day the new owners of the stock wr6te
a letter to the receivers requiring permission to examine the
books of the company, but received no answer. On November 7,
they filed a petition asking for an order of the court permitting
them examination of the books. In this petition they questioned
the validity of the debts claimed by Mrs. lflhler, and complained
of the whole proceeding as a maneuver of their debtor to hinder
recovery on his debts, and to retain the property for his own
benefit. The court dismissed the petition, but, on appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the order of the lower court. In an
elaborate opinion the court held the petitioners to be entitled
to examine the corporation's books in the hands of the receivers:
"The application here is not one for the production of books and
papers by an adversary owner or possessor of them. However the
receivers may stand in personal opposition to the applicants, they are,
as receivers, entirely neutral custodians, and are to be treated as
4 59 Fed. 846, 848 (1894).
- 166 Md. 675, 172 Atl. 242, 92 A. L. R. 1043 (1934).
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such. More accurately, the court itself is the custodian; the receivers
holding for the court. . . . And the holding is not only for the
direct use of the court and its receivers in the administration of the
receivership, but also for the use and benefit of all parties in interest,
including the applicants. . . . The applicants have had from the
beginning an interest in the assets as pledgees and owners of the stock,
conveyed to them as a means of repayment of large loans, and their
interest is involved in a proceeding conducted by representatives of
the pledgors, with the anticipated result of leaving the security good
for nothing. They are, in fact, as the owners of the stock of the
corporation, the only parties now having the ultimate legal interest
in the books. They question the good faith of the receivership pro-
ceeding, charging fraud in it. There are no allegations of specific
wrong to the rights of the applicants, and the purpose seems rather
to be to subject to inquiry a proceeding in which their interests are
affected, but in which they cannot now protect their rights or even
know what they may be, and are left dependent upon the care of
their adversaries in interest. For fraud they might, of course, attack
and reopen the proceeding so far as the fraud might have affected it.
In this situation and for these purposes they must, in the opinion of
this court, be given access to any information the books may contain.
Whatever assurance the court might derive from the character of the
receivers and its own supervision of their receivership relegating the
interests of the appellants to the initiative and fairness of their
opponents in interest would not be a just arrangement. Inspection
of the books may turn out to be without usefulness to the appellants,
but the situation requires that they be given facilities for attending
to their own interests, and the court should not be astute to antici-
pate lack of advantage for them in what they ask, especially when
the relief is so easy.""
IV. RIGHT OF INSPECTION IN CASE OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
UNDER SECTION 77B OF THm BANKRUPTCY ACT
The foregoing discussion has shown that the right of inspec-
tion exists during receivership proceedings. The problem with
-166 Md. 675, 679 (1934). With regard to the argument of the
receivers that the denial of the right of inspection by the lower court
was within the discretion of the court and, therefore, not subject to
review by the appellate tribunal, the Court of Appeals said: "The few
references in the authorities which support this argument have had
to deal only with applications by holders of minor portions of the
stock. . . . But applications even by owners of all the stock might
be opposed by considerations of convenience, and of justice to creditors,
in weighing which the court might be allowed discretion. The exist-
ence of a discretion does not in all cases prevent review, in others dis-
cretion is reviewable. . . . The extent of discretion and the right
of review differ according to the purpose of the discretion. Here the
court is considering, not a mere regulation of order and progress in a
proceeding in court, or in a matter in which the judge's close contact
with the circumstances would give him an understanding preferable
- to that of judges on appeal, so that by reason of these or other circum-
stances it should defer to the judgment of the trial judge. It is con-
sidering an action which might have a much closer connection with
essential justice. Exclusion from access to information might amount
to exclusion of rights from a hearing, and it does not seem permissible
to deny review on complaints of substantial wrong, as here." (Id.,
680, 681.)
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which we have to deal now is whether the right to inspect
corporate books will survive reorganization proceedings under
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Bankruptcy Act itself is silent on this question. The
only reference to the general problem is contained in sub-
section (c), clause (4) of the Section 77B, where it is provided
that the judge in addition to the jurisdiction and powers else-
where in this section conferred upon him "may direct the debtor,
or the trustee or trustees if appointed, to prepare (a) a list of
all known bondholders and creditors of, or claimants against, the
debtor or its property, and the amounts and character of their
debts, claims, and securities, and the last known post-office
address or place of business of each creditor or claimant, and
(b) a list of stockholders of each class of the debtor, with the
last known post-office address or place of business of each, which
lists shall be open to the inspection of any creditor or stockholder
of the debtor, during reasonable business hours, upon application
to the debtor, or to the trustee or trustees, if appointed, and the
contents of such lists shall not constitute admissions by the
debtor or the trustees in a proceeding under this section or
otherwise."
The question raised by these provisions is whether Congress
through their adoption wanted to abridge the stockholders'
common-law right of inspection or whether these provisions
were intended as additional sources of relief for persons desir-
ing information about the state of the affairs of a corporation
in a proceeding under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. A
different answer has been given to this question by two federal
courts which had occasion to consider the problem.
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York
in ln re Busk Terminal Co.,45 held that the right of inspection
is not available to the stockholders of a corporation which is
undergoing reorganization under Section 77B. In this case, the
corporation, which had previously been placed in equity receiver-
ship, had its petition for reorganization under Section 77B
approved by the District Court. Receivers who had served in
the receivership proceedings were designated as trustees of the
debtor. The petitioner was the founder of the corporation, its
president, director and controlling stockholder. After the
O11 F. Supp. 387 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).
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debtor's petition was approved, petitioner filed a plan of re-
organization; his previously proposed plan having been rejected
by the debtor's board of directors. Desiring to call a meeting
of the stockholders for the purpose of electing a new board of
directors the petitioner applied to the District Court for an order
to direct the trustees to permit him to inspect the debtor's stock
book and obtain therefrom a list of stockholders. The District
Court, however, denied the application on the apparent ground
that the stockholder's right of inspection which he claimed both
under the common law and the statute of New York"0 has been
limited by Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act.
"State statutes must yield to the bankruptcy law, as amended (11
USCA) and do not give a remedy where the bankruptcy court deter-
mines that such remedy interferes with the proper efforts of this
court to rehabilitate the debtor rather than liquidate it. The title
to all the assets of the debtor is in these trustees, and this court has
exclusive jurisdiction over same. Moreover, certain tentative plans,
In accordance with section 77B, have already been submitted and
referred to a special master. The whole purpose of this court, there-
fore, is now directed towards a possible rehabilitation of this debtor
within a reasonable time. . . . Section 77B however does, it seems
to me, contemplate that, if a creditor or stockholder desires, for
instance, to get in touch with those of his own class for the purpose
of presenting a plan or opposing a plan, and a proper application is
made by way of a committee or otherwise for this purpose or for some
other purpose fairly shown to be helpful to the rehabilitation of the
debtor and within due safeguards laid down, then, on the presentation
of such application, on due notice to the trustees, such information
may be available by proper direction of the judge pursuant to (c)
(4) (b) of the act, 11 USCA §207 (c) (4) (b). 47
The District Court also emphasized that the petitioner
could not possibly desire a stockholders' meeting to present a
plan of reorganization, since he had already proposed a plan
and that the present application would certainly tend to obstruct
the reorganization of the debtor corporation.
"It serves no purpose to now have injected into this proceeding
stockholders' fights, efforts to control the debtor, criticism of manage.
ment, etc., all of which, while occasionally present in ordinary corpo-
rate management, have no place when the court, having sole charge
over the debtor, is seeking to reorganize it under section 77B, 11
USCA §207. The applicant does not desire to obtain a list of the
stockholders for the purpose of presenting a plan, for, as I have said,
two tentative plans, one of them by him, are already before the
special master, and before that official all discussions and suggestions
of other plans or modifications should and must take place. All
creditors and stockholders must have notice of these hearings and
40N. Y. Stock Corporation Law, § 10 (Consol. Laws N. Y. c. 59).
See People ex re7. Lorge v. Consolidated Nat. Bank, 105 App. Div. 409,
94 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1905).
4711 F. Supp. 387, 388 (1935).
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of all Important steps in this proceeding. Moreover, the trustees are
not presenting any plan, for that is the duty of creditors or debtor.
While the trustees are continuing the business of the debtor, and
while, both as receivers and now as trustees, it appears to the court
that they have rendered excellent and skillful service in this regard,
nevertheless, the debtor is in an entirely different position in regard
to stock transfers, etc., from what it would be had not these receiver-
ships and bankruptcy proceedings intervened. Consequently, nothing
will be gained by a meeting of stockholders, at this time, to elect new
directors and possibly to thus interfere with the present management
of the business by these trustees, through the present board, which
seems to be functioning in co-operation with the trustees, pending
the acceptance or rejection of a plan. The* extraordinary power of
this court granted by Congress pursuant to section 77B, while it
should be cautiously and intelligently exercised, seems to me to extend
to such supervision over the calling of such meetings or other acts of
the debtor which would appear to the court to be opposed to, or which
may reasonably tend to obstruct, a speedy reorganization of the
debtor."'"
From the order of the District Court denying the appli-
cation petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Thereupon, in In re Bush Terminal Co.,4 9 the Circuit Court
declared that the lower court erred in refusing the right to
inspect and, accordingly, reversed the order of the District
Court. Judge Manton, who delivered the opinion of the court,
pointed out that the right of inspection is not affected by pro-
ceedings under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, and that
the reorganization court may grant leave to inspect the corporate
books, whenever a proper case arises for inspection.
"While it was possible for Congress to limit, for proper reason,
this right to examine the books, it has not done so. The court below
believed that section 77B, sub-see. (c) (4), 11 U. S. C. A., § 207
(c) (4), did limit the stockholders' right of inspection. While this
provision might be. considered as merely giving a stockholder the
right in addition to that which was his under the state statute and
the common law, such would be a strained interpretation of the
subdivision of the act. The natural and obvious meaning is that the
statute gives the judge the power to deny the right to inspect upon
circumstances which call forth the exercise of such discretionary
refusal. The use of the word "may" indicates that the judge is given
the power, but not the absolute duty, to permit inspection, and
though that power would be ordinarily exercised, it seems to be con-
templated by the statute that the judge may refuse to exercise it
where its exertion would, for one reason or another, be detrimental
or harmful to the process of reorganization. Such is not the case
here. The district judge erred in denying the appellant's application
for inspection, for no ground was shown for the exercise of such
power. Appellant was a large stockholder of the debtor. He was
the dominating influence as regards the action of a great number of
other stockholders. He desired a list of the stockholders so as to
call a meeting of them and elect a new board of directors. It was the
i.id.
478 F. (2d) 662 (0. C. A. 2d, 1935).
KENTUo K LAw JOURNAL
opinion of the District Court that a meeting to elect new directors
would possibly interfere with appellees' management of the business,
and reasonably tend to obstruct a reorganization of the debtor. But,
as here contended by the appellant, to refuse the stockholders free
action in the matter of voting for directors may cause the stock-
holders to be represented by directors who did not truly represent
them, and the stockholders are the real parties in interest . ..
It would seem proper for the purposes of section 77B, 11 U. S. C. A.,
§207, and the protection of the stockholders' rights, that there be unre-
stricted communication between the stockholders. The court should not
so restrict, by declining inspection of the list of stockholders, this free-
dom of action. The stockholders ought to be free to communicate with
each other and express their opinions as to terms and conditions as to
all matters pertaining to the interests of themselves as stockholders.
By section 77B, sub-sec. (c), (11), 11 U. S. C. A., §207 (c) (11), the
debtor is given the right to be heard on all questions. Obviously, the
stockholders should have the right to be adequately represented in the
conduct of the debtor's affairs, especially in such an important matter
as the reorganization of the debtor. Such representation can be obtained
only by having as directors persons of their choice. By sub-section (d),
11 U. S. C. A., §207 (d), the debtor is given the power to propose a
plan of reorganization. No reason is advanced why stockholders, if
they feel that the present board of directors is not acting in their
interest, or has caused an unsatisfactory plan to be filed on behalf
of the debtor, should not cause a new board to be elected which will
act in conformance with the stockholders' wishes. The court below
expressed the opinion that should a new board of directors file a
plan on behalf of the debtor and it conflicts with the one previously
filed, confusion might arise. No fanciful 'endless confusion', as stated
below, should deprive stockholders of the right to be adequately
represented by directors of their own selection. That appellant seeks
to control the debtor is of no concern if he is in a position to obtain
control. He obtained the right to such control by having control of
more than a majority of the stock."'5
-78 F. (2d) 662, 664 (1935). With regard to the appellant's right
of procuring a stockholders' meeting for the purpose of electing a new
board of directors, the Circuit Court went on to say: "A court of
equity or bankruptcy may enjoin any action which would tend to
defeat or impair its jurisdiction. See Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 55 S. Ct.
595, 79 L. Ed. 1110; Section 2 (15) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A.,§ 11 (15). This power in the court is extraordinary and should be
exercised only where the harm, likely to flow from the stockholders'
action, is more real than here, and disproportionate to the good obtain-
able. The corporation can act only through its board of directors
selected by its stockholders. Regard for this has been had by the
legislation resulting in section 77B, 11 U. S. C. A., § 207. The board
of directors of the corporation, having the right to submit a plan or
participate in a reorganization plan, must necessarily have freedom of
action for its consideration. If the right of stockholders to elect a
board of directors should not be carefully guarded and protected, the
statute giving the debtor a right to be heard or to propose a plan of
reorganization could not truly be exercised, for the board of directors
is the representative of the stockholders." (Id., 665.) The court dis-
tinguished the case at bar from the case of Graselli Chemical Co. v.
Xtna Explosives Co., 252 Fed. 456 (1918), which granted an injunction
staying a stockholders' meeting when the corporation was in receiver-
ship on the ground that such a meeting would interfere unduly with
the reorganization plans. The court pointed out that in the Graselli
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As the law now stands, under the ruling of the Second
Circuit in the Bush Terminal case, the stockholders' right of
inspection survives reorganization proceedings under Section
77B of the Bankruptcy Act. However, like in the receiver-
ship cases discussed previously, this right does not survive
as an absolute right of the stockholders, but as right which
may be enforced or denied at the discretion of the court. As
a general rule, the courts will be liberal in granting the right
of inspection and insist that impediment in rapidity of reorgani-
zation be subservient to the protection of the stockholders' rights
under Section 77B. On the other hand, the reorganization
courts will refuse to permit inspection, if such permission would
be detrimental or harmful to the process of reorganization. Just
what intended acts or purposes of an applicant will justify a
court in refusing permission to inspect has to be left to the
courts' rulings in future litigations.
case the receivers had made a good profit and could have paid off the
preferred stockholders of the corporation and would pay them off in
the near future, the preferred stockholders having been paid all past
dividends. As their right to vote was limited to the question of mort-
gaging property of the corporation except where their dividends had
not been paid for over eight months, permitting an election at that
time would have given preferred stockholders control of the corpora-
tion when they would soon after be paid off and have no voice in the
management of the corporation, and so be inequitable to the rights of
the common holders. For the importance which the courts have at-
tached to a truly representative board for the corporation under sec-
tion 77B, see also In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 10 F. Supp. 414 (D.
Md. 1935).
